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Abstract  
Recently, there has been a surge in bilateral and regional trade arrangements between 
developed and developing countries, which are known as North-South RTAs. Under the 
current legal system of the WTO, North-South RTAs are governed by Article XXIV of the 
GATT or Article V of the GATS, which means such RTAs must be reciprocal and must cover 
substantially all the trade. On the other hand, there is another category of rules on RTAs 
based on the so-called Enabling Clause, which, in exceptional circumstances, provides 
special and differential treatment (SDT) for RTAs among developing countries. This paper 
considers the applicability of the SDT concept to North-South RTAs by examining why rules 
on RTAs and the concept of SDT were incorporated into the GATT/WTO legal framework so 
as to permit the derogation of most-favored-nation (MFN) obligations. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Since the 1990s, there has been a global trend toward bilateral and regional trade 
arrangements. The number of such arrangements that have been formed, or are currently 
being negotiated, has dramatically increased, and consequently, at present almost all countries 
are party to such arrangements. One of the characteristics of recent regional trade agreements 
(RTAs) are their comprehensiveness. Not only do they cover the reduction or elimination of 
tariffs and other non-tariff barriers on the trade of goods and services, but they also cover 
broader elements such as investment rules, intellectual property rights and so on. 
Besides this comprehensiveness, a noteworthy feature of recent RTAs is that those 
formed between developed and developing countries (hereafter referred to as North-South 
RTAs) are on the increase in terms of both number and impact. In the Asian region in 
particular, North-South RTAs have become a hot issue owing to changes in Japan’s trade 
policy. From the late 1990s, Japan actively began to promote RTAs in order to strengthen 
cooperative relationships between itself and other countries in the region. RTAs including 
Japan and other Asian countries inevitably fall into the category of North-South RTAs. In 
negotiations with Japan, Asia’s developing countries seem to show an attitude that they do 
not necessarily oblige equal liberalization to Japan. 
Under the current legal system of the World Trade Organization (WTO), there are two 
categories of rules on RTAs in the area of trade in goods: the first is based on Article XXIV of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (General Agreement), which generally applies to 
all RTAs; the second is based on the so-called Enabling Clause, which, in exceptional 
circumstances, provides special and differential treatment (SDT) for RTAs among developing 
countries. Although both categories allow for deviations from the WTO guiding principle of 
non-discrimination, the necessary conditions of RTAs negotiated under the rules differ 
considerably. The criteria stipulated in Article XXIV are much stricter than the ones of the 
Enabling Clause. This dualistic legal framework means that developing countries tend to 
believe that they can be exempt from equal liberalization when they negotiate bilateral or 
regional RTAs with developed countries. 
The kind of rules that govern North-South RTAs influences the kind of contents and 
levels of liberalization to which the parties of such RTAs agree. In order to clarify the 
applicable rules on North-South RTAs, this paper considers why rules on RTAs and the 
concept of SDT were incorporated into the GATT/WTO legal framework so as to permit the 
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derogation of most-favored-nation (MFN) obligations (Parts II and III respectively). This 
paper also looks at existing practices of North-South RTAs (Part IV) and the way in which 
North-South RTAs are made compatible with WTO rules (Part V). 
 
 
II.  Applicable Rules on RTAs 
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1 system was established in order to 
prevent the discriminatory trade practices contributed to the development of economic blocs 
before World War II. The GATT, therefore, adopted non-discrimination as a fundamental 
principle. An unconditional MFN clause was incorporated into Article I of the General 
Agreement, as this was conceived as the most effective measure for applying the 
non-discrimination principle to actual trade practices. Thus, the GATT strictly confined 
preferences to the practices that existed when it was established,2 meaning that it would not 
in principle permit the creation of any new preferences. However, there is no principle 
without exceptions, and RTAs are formally recognized as exceptions to MFN obligations 
under the GATT/WTO system. 
 
II-1.  Background: Approving RTAs as Exceptions to MFN Treatment 
 
In Article XXIV of the General Agreement, exceptions to MFN treatment are provided in 
three situations: traffic frontiers, Customs Unions (CUs), or free trade areas. It is the latter 
two arrangements which are usually referred to as RTAs. Even an interim agreement leading 
to the formation of a CU or a free trade area is included in this provision. As to frontier traffic 
and CUs, they have been recognized as exemptions to MFN obligations in many bilateral 
commercial agreements for more than two hundred years. At the drafting process of the 
General Agreement, therefore, the inclusion of these exceptions in the agreement was 
uncontroversial. 
Besides frontier traffic and CUs, the GATT broadly permits the formation of free trade 
                                                     
1 Though the GATT was not originally an institution established under a treaty-based instrument like the United 
Nations, but merely a general agreement, it has had an actual secretariat and has functioned as a de facto 
international institution. In order to distinguish these two aspects of the term, in this paper, the term “GATT” 
will mean institution and the term “General Agreement” will mean international agreement. 
2 Article I simply allows preferential trading arrangements in force at the time of GATT’s establishment to last 
as exceptions to the MFN principle with the conditions listed in the Annex. Almost all are imperial 
preferences or preferences between neighboring states. 
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areas as an exception to MFN treatment. Why did the GATT let a provision for free trade 
areas come into the agreement? The first Draft Charter for the International Trade 
Organization (ITO), which was put forward by the US government in 1946, recognized only 
CUs as exceptions to the MFN rule.3 It was at the drafting conference that the original 
concept of free trade areas appeared.4 In 1947, developing countries proposed the initial 
concept of free trade areas where “two or more developing countries might be prepared to 
abolish all trade barriers among themselves, though not wishing to construct a common tariff 
towards the rest of the world.” 5  Developing countries might have thought that 
non-discrimination principles did not always benefit them and a certain degree of preferential 
treatment would be necessary in order to promote their economic development. Moreover, 
they needed schemes more flexible than CUs because they regarded these as very poor 
measures for utilizing preferential treatment due to their strict conditions.6 The concept of a 
free trade area received support from many participants in the drafting session, especially 
from European countries, and it was successfully incorporated into the draft agreement. 
European countries regarded this concept of free trade areas as an extension of the 
bilateral preferential trade arrangements that had been a common practice in Europe before 
World War II. It was uncertain whether the first proposal of free trade areas had reciprocity as 
a feature. However, it came to absorb reciprocity as a feature after the European countries 
took the initiative and introduced their own free trade area. The GATT included this provision 
because it was recognized from the outset that member countries would want to establish 
certain reciprocally-preferential economic relationships.7 In addition, it was pointed out that 
most of the GATT contracting parties had in effect taken the position that some 
discrimination would help to promote trade liberalization and that not all discrimination was 
bad.8 
During the ITO drafting session, the United States intended that preferences should be 
                                                     
3 In March 1948, the ITO Charter was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment in 
Havana. Since only two countries ratified the Charter, the plan to establish the ITO lost momentum. However, 
in order to enforce the results of the round, parts of the ITO Charter were selected to form the core of the 
General Agreement. 
4 GATT, The Most-favoured-nation Clause in GATT: The Rule and the Exceptions. 4 J.WORLD TRADE L. 791, 
798 (1970). 
5 F. A. Haight, , Customs Unions and Free-Trade Areas under GATT: A Reappraisal, 6 J. World Trade L. 391, 
394 (1972). 
6 In order that a preferential arrangement is authorized as a CU, it should meet at least three requirements: the 
elimination of duties among parties, the setup of common external tariffs, and the harmonization of foreign 
trade regulations. 
7 Max Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral Agreements, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 19 (1989). 
8 Haight, supra note 5, at 393, and Robert E Hudec, Tiger, Tiger in the House: A Critical Appraisal of the Case 
against Discriminatory Trade Measures, 175-6 (Petersmann and Hilf eds., 1991). 
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restrained and ultimately eliminated. Yet the US government also intended to apply the 
General Agreement as widely as possible in order to enhance its effectiveness. To realize this 
second objective, it was considered necessary to involve as many countries as possible. 
However, many countries attending the drafting conference placed more value on 
“reciprocity” than “non-discrimination.” With the purpose of convincing nations to join the 
GATT, the drafters had to include several measures that would allow nations to pursue their 
national interests and ease their fears about yielding sovereignty to an international body.9 As 
a result, the United States compromised on the issue of including new preferences and 
accepted free trade areas as an exception to the unconditional MFN clause. 
The flexibility in the MFN obligation of the General Agreement was quite necessary.10 
Free trade areas were adopted in Article XXIV so that they could function as a control valve 
to reconcile the internal conflict between MFN treatment and reciprocity in the fundamental 
GATT principles. 
 
II-2.  General Rules on RTAs under the WTO System 
 
In order to allow the establishment of RTAs as an exception to the guiding principle of 
non-discrimination, the GATT/WTO, depending on the type of RTAs, imposes specific 
conditions through three sets of rules. These are: Paragraph 4 to 10 of Article XXIV of the 
General Agreement,11 Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and 
the so-called Enabling Clause. These are the only general rules regarding RTAs which have 
legally-biding power in the current regime of international economic law. 
 
Article XXIV of the General Agreement 
The provisions of Article XXIV of the General Agreement provide the basic rules on 
preferential arrangements covering trade in goods. A CU is defined as “the substitution of a 
single customs territory for two or more customs territories” between the territories of contracting 
parties, while a free trade area is described as “a group of two or more customs territories in 
which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated” (General 
Agreement, Article XXIV: 8). In order to be identified as a CU or a free trade area, an 
                                                     
9 Baucus, supra note 7, at 5. 
10 Hudec, supra note 20, at 175. 
11 The original Article XXIV in the General Agreement is complemented by an additional Article XXIV in 
Annex I that describes notes and supplementary provisions. It is also clarified in the Understanding on the 
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. 
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agreement has to meet the condition, set out in the provisions of Article XXIV, that is usually 
phrased as “substantially all the trade.” This requires that duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce must be eliminated on “substantially all the trade” between the 
constituent territories of a CU or a free trade area in products originating in such territories.12 
Besides the condition, “substantially all the trade,” Article XXIV further stipulates 
certain criteria for the formation of RTAs. 
 
• A “stand still” condition: the duties and other regulations of commerce should not on 
the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and 
regulations of such commerce applicable in these countries prior to the formation of a 
CU or free trade area.  
• “A reasonable length of time” condition: any CU or free trade area should be formed 
within “a reasonable length of time.” This ambiguous term has lately been clarified to 
mean exceeding ten years only in exceptional circumstances. 
• All RTAs and interim agreements must be notified to the Council for Trade in Goods 
(CTG) and be examined by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) 
for their conformity to these criteria. 
 
In addition to these criteria, a panel report in 1994 clarified several other conditions for 
RTAs.13 
 
• Because of the use of the plural in the phrase “between the constituent territories” in 
Article XXIV: 8, all parties should liberalize their trade in products on a reciprocal 
basis. 
• Article XXIV only covers RTAs “between the territories of contracting parties.” In 
other words, any RTA involving a non-contracting party cannot be understood as an 
RTA in the terms of Article XXIV and, consequently, cannot be justified as an 
exception to MFN obligations. In order for RTAs involving non-members to be 
approved, the procedure is expected to be in accordance with Article XXIV: 10. 
 
The lack of precision and clarity of requirements generates problems in applying these 
                                                     
12 Because of its unclear language, calculating “substantially all the trade” is at the center of the argument. 
13 GATT, EEC – Import Regime for Bananas, Report of the Panel, DS38/R, Report of the Panel, 11 February, 
(1994). 
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rules to RTAs. The examination mechanism regarding the consistency of RTAs to WTO rules 
does not function properly, which exacerbates the problem. Accordingly, de facto deviation 
from GATT discipline and such a situation can and will be able to be observed as partial or 
discretionary RTAs have spread out. 
 
Article V of the GATS 
The GATS, which entered into effect in 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round, stipulates 
MFN treatment as a general obligation under Article II, whereas the provisions of Article V 
allow member countries to enter into bilateral or regional agreements to liberalize trade in 
services. The basic conditions are equal to the terms of Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement: 
 
• The “substantially all the trade” condition: agreements shall have substantial sectoral 
coverage; 
• The “stand still” condition: agreements shall eliminate existing discriminatory 
measures and/or prohibit new or more discriminatory measures; 
• Agreements shall be notified to the Council for Trade in Services (CTS). 
 
Importantly, provisions of Article V of the GATS cover all RTAs concluded in the area 
of trade in services regardless of the status of its participants in the WTO. Whoever the 
parties to an RTA—that is North-North, South-South or North-South RTAs—every RTA is 
treated equally. This is the distinctive feature of Article V of the GATS that differs from the 
rules of RTAs in the sphere of trade in goods. 
 
The Enabling Clause 
The GATT decision by the contracting parties on November 28, 1979,14 usually referred to 
as the Enabling Clause, legalized derogations from MFN obligations in favor of developing 
countries. With respect to RTAs, paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause allows preferential 
trade in goods among developing countries without the need to fulfill all the conditions of 
article XXIV.15 
?
                                                     
14 The formal title of the decision is “Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries.” The decision was one of result of the Tokyo Round (1973–9). 
15 The lack of definition of a “developing country” within the GATT/WTO leads to another problem of what 
countries can enjoy the rights granted by these provisions. 
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• The Enabling Clause covers regional or global arrangements entered into “amongst 
less-developed contracting parties” for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs 
and non-tariff measures “on products;” 
• Trade arrangements among developing countries are designed not to raise barriers to 
or create undue difficulties for trade with any other contracting parties;  
• Trade arrangements among developing countries shall not constitute an impediment 
to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and other restrictions to trade on an MFN 
basis; 
• Trade arrangements among developing countries are to be reported to the Committee 
on Trade and Development (CTD). Notification and examination of the consistency 
of such arrangements with WTO rules are not essentially required.16 
 
The introduction of the Enabling Clause into the GATT/WTO legal framework implies 
approval of two different rules applicable to preferential trade arrangements in goods. Which 
rule applies to the relevant RTA depends on the status of participating parties. RTAs that 
include even one developed country as a participating party are governed by Article XXIV, 
whereas RTAs between developing countries fall into the Enabling Clause category. From the 
viewpoint of the current WTO legal system, North-South RTAs are covered by Article XXIV. 
However, as the number of North-South RTAs increases, and as recognition of the usefulness 
of such RTAs spreads among developing countries, these countries are requesting extensions 
to the applicable range of the Enabling Clause to North-South RTAs. 
 
 
III.  Historical Review of the SDT Concept 
 
The provisions of Article XXIV were originally incorporated into the General Agreement at 
the drafting stage, as a result of a compromise between two principles, non-discrimination 
and reciprocity. By contrast, the Enabling Clause was added to the GATT/WTO legal 
framework later, as a consequence of the strong demand for preferential treatment in favor of 
developing countries. It should be noted that the grounds for justifying such a deviation from 
the MFN obligation through the Enabling Clause differ from the grounds for such a 
                                                     
16 However, some cases were or are examined for their compatibility with WTO rules by the related committee. 
For example, Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) is under examination by the CRTA. 
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justification under Article XXIV. The Enabling Clause is based on the SDT normative 
guideline in favor of developing countries. 
 
III-1.  The Developmental Process of the SDT Concept 
 
As widely recognized, the GATT adopted a non-discrimination principle as the most 
appropriate concept in order to establish a stable and liberalized international trade system. 
An unconditional MFN clause was deemed the only approach for realizing the 
non-discrimination principle in multilateral trade. These thoughts reflected the prevailing 
ideas when the General Agreement was drafted—that “MFN treatment transposes equality 
under international law into the economic field.”17 The principle of sovereign equality under 
traditional international law was based on the assumption that each nation state had identical 
abilities. This assumption did not take into account de facto inequality, such as different 
stages of development between countries. It essentially supposed that international society 
consists of homogenous and consequently equal nation-states, and it considered that de facto 
inequality could be eliminated as long as it did not significantly prevent nation states from 
excising their rights.18 
 In the mid-1950s, however, a new idea arose against this entrenched belief. Its 
proponents argued that the single legal framework based on a false assumption of equality 
between states should be replaced with a two-tier structure: one tier would apply to relations 
among developed countries, while the other would apply to relations between developed and 
developing countries. This idea of differential treatment was based on the argument that equal 
treatment could secure equality only among identical parties, but it was only unequal 
treatment which could correct inequalities between different parties. The resulting view was 
that “the operation of a MFN clause is not an adequate or expedient means of ensuring that 
international trade becomes an instrument of progress, especially for the benefit of the 
developing countries, as it is now universally agreed that it should be.”19 
The original General Agreement did not include any SDT provisions for developing 
countries, even though the ITO Charter, which was a prototypical agreement of the General 
Agreement, permitted, in exceptional circumstances, the exemption of developing countries 
                                                     
17 Eector Gros Espiell, The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause: Its Present Significance in GATT, 5 J.WORLD 
TRADE L. 29, 35 (1971). 
18 Ryuichi Ida, Kokusai Boueki Taisei To Hattentojokoku [Multilateral Trading System and Developing 
Countries], 463 KOKUSAI MONDAI 48, 61-2 (1985). 
19 Espiell, supra note 17, at 29. 
 9 
from the Charter’s legal obligations on the basis of “economic development.” 20  The 
developing countries were never satisfied at receiving equal treatment under the initial GATT 
system, and began to advocate obtaining special status. The active and organized demanded 
to have provisions securing SDT for developing countries started in 1964 when the first 
conference of the UNCTAD was held. In this sense, the UNCTAD was aimed at restructuring 
the ITO Charter.21 In the following year, the GATT added provisions regarding trade and 
development, as Part IV of the General Agreement, with the strong backing of the 
UNCTAD.22 In response to the addition of Part IV, it was Australia that first provided 
preferences to developing countries on a non-reciprocal basis. The noteworthy change that 
took place with the addition of Part IV was the shift of relations between developed and 
developing countries from reciprocal to non-reciprocal relationships. Article XXXVI 
specifies that “developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments in trade 
negotiations to remove tariff and other barriers to the trade of the less developed contracting 
parties.” 
 Tissue considers that the incorporation of Part IV introduced a radical change to GATT 
principles.23 Hudec also points out that “the major significance of Part IV was its force as an 
agreed statement of principle.”24 At the level of rules, however, there was no immediate 
change because Part IV did not impose any legal obligations on developed countries to grant 
SDT to developing countries. Preferential trade arrangements in favor of developing 
countries were still a voluntary option. Delegates from developed countries tended to regard 
Part IV as a general and elusive declaration and, consequently, as having no value in a 
negotiating venue where governments dealt in concrete and meaningful trade actions.25 In 
such circumstances, the enjoyment of the benefits of trade preferences for developing 
                                                     
20 The ITO Charter contained exceptional provisions in favor of developing countries that were approved 
because they were expected to help with the economic development of these countries. For example, Article 
XV of the ITO Charter provided that “new preferences could be granted in the interest of economic 
development or reconstruction of one or more of the parties.” However, these articles relating to developing 
countries were not included in the General Agreement. ROBERT E HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE 
GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 7-18 (Gower Publishing Company 1987) (1987). 
21 Shigehisa Kasahara, UNCTAD –Sono Katsudo no Kaiko to Tenbo [The UNCTAD –Past, Present and Future], 
25-6 (Ippei Yamazawa ed., Gaisetsu UNCTAD no Sin Hatten Senryaku [New Development Strategy of 
UNCTAD], Institute of Developing Economies Topic Report No.41, IDE (2001)). 
22 These movements had as their theoretical background the idea of international law of development. Tovias 
describes the reason why SDT in favor of developing countries was accepted in the General Agreement: 
“because it was considered to be a step in the right direction, namely switching gradually from a principle of 
formal non-discrimination to substantive-discrimination.” Alfred Tovias, Trade Discrimination in the Thirties 
and Eighties, 11 THE WORLD ECON. 501, 513 (1988). 
23 DIANA TUSSIE, THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 29 (Frances Pinter 
1987) (1987). 
24 HUDEC, supra note 20, at 58. 
25 Id, at 58. 
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countries was very precarious. Subsequently, developing countries merged their different 
goals and aimed instead at obtaining legal grounds for a Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP), which brought benefits to all developing countries, albeit to varying degrees. The fact 
that Part IV was not legally binding also led to legal instability for developed, 
preference-giving countries. They were still bound by their treaty obligations under Article I, 
and the implementation of a GSP would violate this MFN clause. 
 On June 25, 1971, the GATT granted a “waiver” for a ten-year period to developed, 
preference-giving countries which could justify their deviation from the MFN clause on the 
basis of having to implement a GSP.26 Soon after, the European Community (EC) put the 
first GSP scheme into operation, followed by Japan, the United States and other developed 
countries. However, the utilization of a waiver procedure, pursuant to Article XXV: 5, to 
approve a GSP implied that non-reciprocal preferential treatment was still considered a 
special case in the GATT legal system.27 It was not until the adoption of the Enabling Clause 
in 1979 that developed countries could avoid criticism that they were deviating from their 
obligations under the MFN clause in giving SDT to developing countries. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the style of negotiations in the GATT was conditioned by the 
structural outline of contraposition between developed and developing countries. In order to 
introduce the new legal relationship embodied in the SDT concept, therefore, unified 
cooperation among developing countries was needed. However, differences among 
developing countries had the potential to weaken their bargaining power at the GATT. As a 
result, demands for SDT inevitably included the idea that developing countries should be 
treated as a unit and that every developing country could benefit from SDT, which meant 
non-discrimination among developing countries. A GSP scheme, through which developed 
countries would grant tariff preferences equally to all developing countries, albeit allowing 
for the possibility of providing more generous preferences to all least-developed countries, 
most clearly reflected this feature. Besides non-reciprocity between developed and 
developing countries, MFN treatment governing relations among developing countries was 
adopted as another operating principle of SDT. 
 
                                                     
26 The incorporation of a GSP into the GATT system was strongly attributed to the UNCTAD elaboration of the 
“Agreed Conclusion of the Special Committee on Preferences,” which initiated the establishment of GSPs in 
the global trading system. 
27 TADAYOSHI TAKASHIMA, KAIHATSU NO KOKUSAIHO [International Law of Development] 271 (Keio Tsushin 
1995) (1995). 
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III-2.  The Introductory Process of the Enabling Clause 
 
The Enabling Clause has created a permanent legal basis for SDT in favor of developing 
countries. However, it does not cover all forms of preferential treatment from developed to 
developing countries, being confined to only three types of trade preferences: 
 
(a) preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products 
originating in developing contracting parties in accordance with a GSP; 
(b) regional and global arrangements amongst less-developed contracting parties for the 
mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-tariff measures on products 
imported from one another; 
(c) special treatment for the least developed among the developing countries in the 
context of any general or specific measures in favor of developing countries. 
 
The coverage of the Enabling Clause shows that it does not establish a legal basis for 
trade preferences from developed countries to limited groups of developing countries, even if 
they are formed for development-oriented purposes. Thus, the question arises as to why the 
Enabling Clause does not cover North-South RTAs. In order to clarify this issue, it is helpful 
to observe the process by which the Enabling Clause was finally incorporated into the GATT 
legal system. 
 The Enabling Clause was primarily aimed at granting a perpetual legal basis to two 
types of preference schemes—the GSP and trade preferences among developing 
countries—and the application of MFN treatment to these two schemes was waived for ten 
years from 1971. Because the waiver expiration date was approaching, the implementation of 
a GSP by developed countries and the exchange of tariff preferences among developing 
countries would be in violation of their treaty obligations. Therefore, there was a pressing 
need to find a way by which these preferences could be made compatible with Article I of the 
General Agreement. In this sense, the coverage of the Enabling Clause was strongly 
influenced by the fact that the GATT adopted waivers on MFN treatment in 1971. 
When the GSP waiver was recognized, some developing countries brought forward an 
objection to the generalized system from which all developing countries could benefit evenly. 
Some limited groups of developing countries had already enjoyed preferential market access 
to developed countries. For example, eighteen African countries were allowed preferential 
tariff rates in the EEC markets through the Yaounde Convention, which was concluded in 
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1963.28 These countries were concerned about losing existing preferences and insisted that a 
GSP should provide them with at least equivalent advantages as compensation for sharing 
their preferential market with other developing countries and to redress any adverse effects 
resulting from the introduction of a GSP.29 In reality, they might want to call for SDT on 
North-South preferential arrangements for limited group of developing countries. However, 
the African countries finally accepted the generalized form of preferences in order to 
establish a GSP in the GATT framework. For developing countries as a whole, the highest 
priority was put on the introduction of a GSP. 
The number of North-South RTAs was still very small after the waiver for a GSP was 
approved, even though some cases existed, such as the arrangement of the first Lomé 
Convention between the EC and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in 1976. At 
the time, North-South preferential schemes were not such a hot item.30 Therefore, there was 
almost no discussion in the GATT as to whether North-South RTAs should be covered by the 
Enabling Clause. 
So, why were South-South RTAs, let alone a GSP, included in the Enabling Clause? In 
the context of SDT, much more attention was likely to be paid to a GSP than preferential 
arrangements among developing countries. However, the latter were deemed to have a 
significant effect on economic development31 and were concluded in 1965 after the addition 
of Part IV to the General Agreement. For example, India, the United Arab Republic (present 
Egypt) and Yugoslavia signed a preferential trade agreement on December 23, 1967.32 
Another example, evaluated as “the most important preferential arrangement among 
developing states concluded within the framework of the GATT,”33  was the Protocol 
                                                     
28 The Yaounde Convention was an ancestor to the Lomé convention. Eighteen members are former African 
colonies of EEC member states: Burundi, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), 
Congo (Kinshasa), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Somalia, Togo, Upper Volta. These African countries set up the “Associated African States and Madagascar 
(AASM).” However, because this agreement was based on the principle of reciprocity, members of AASM 
had to undertake obligations to provide preferences on imports from the EEC. KEIICHI MAEDA, EU NO 
KAIHATSU ENJO SEISAKU [Development Assistance Policy of the EU] 17-20 (Ochanomizu Syobo 2000) 
(2000). 
29 R. Krishnamurti, The Agreement on Preferences: A Generalized System in favour of Developing Countries, 5 
J.WORLD TRADE L.45, 50 (1971). 
30 It was after the Enabling Clause was introduced that attention was paid to the Lomé convention for its 
geographical discrimination (Tovias, supar note 22, at 504. 
31 As mentioned in Part II, the first advocates of preferential trade arrangements in the drafting process of the 
General Agreement were developing countries. 
32 These countries presented the agreement to the GATT as “a modest pioneering effort in trade expansion” 
which had “evolved in pursuance of obligations under Part IV of the Agreement.” Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, 
Differential and More Favourable Treatment: The GATT Enabling Clause, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 488, 489 
(1980). 
33 Id, at 491. 
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Relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries (PTN), which was enforced in 
1973. These two arrangements were not intended to fulfill the criteria for forming a CU or an 
FTA as stipulated under Article XXIV. Nor did Part IV of the GATT grant any legal basis for 
preferential arrangements among developing countries. A working party was established at 
the GATT to discuss the measures to be taken regarding a preferential trade agreement among 
India, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, and the GATT permitted these countries to 
proceed with their agreement by a 1968 decision but not by granting a waiver.34 
It is impossible to compare RTAs among developing countries with RTAs among 
developed countries. Developing countries have come to demand that their RTAs should be 
authorized even when they fall short of the conditions stipulated in Article XXIV. Moreover, 
when Part IV of the General Agreement came into force, a distinction was made between the 
possible systems applicable to negotiations between developed and developing countries and 
those applicable to negotiations among developed countries. Similarly, GATT members 
recognized the need to apply different criteria to each case in the context of RTAs rather than 
to apply absolute and general rules.35 The provisions for RTAs among developing countries 
were inserted into the Enabling Clause in order to confirm the operation of existing 
preferences among these countries. 
By contrast, some believe that North-South RTAs provisions were intentionally 
excluded from the Enabling Clause.36 If the Enabling Clause covers both South-South and 
North-South RTAs, two conditions should be necessary. The UNCTAD, which was the main 
proactive institution to insert the Enabling Clause into the GATT system, did not insist on 
differentiation among developing countries, and developing countries did not necessarily 
stand together regarding the provision of North-South preferences to limited groups of 
developing countries.37 Consequently, developing countries started their struggle to obtain 
SDT with South-South RTAs, while North-South RTAs were excluded from the negotiations 
on the Enabling Clause from a strategic viewpoint. 
International organizations, especially the UNCTAD, continued to take a negative stance 
toward differentiation among developing countries. If North-South RTAs were excluded 
from the coverage of the Enabling Clause for strategic reasons, it is difficult for SDT to be 
                                                     
34 GATT, BISD, 16th Supplement, (1969). 
35 Espiell, supra note 17, at 38. 
36 Interview with a UNCTAD official, November 2003. 
37 When the Yaounde Convention negotiations started, some developing countries feared that they would be 
bypassed by the institutionalization of a system of preferences. As a representative of excluded countries, 
India objected that “the negotiations that are taking place with a view to association of the 18 African and 
Malagasy states with the EEC are a deviation from GATT rules.” Tussie, supra note 23, at 28. 
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introduced into North-South RTAs on the initiative of the UNCTAD. On the other hand, if 
North-South RTAs were not intentionally excluded from the Enabling Clause, the 
applicability of SDT to North-South RTAs is open to question, because the situation has 
changed considerably and the number of North-South RTAs is rapidly increasing. 
?
?
IV.  Practices of North-South RTAs in the WTO System 
 
In the current world trade system, there are non-generalized and non-reciprocal preferential 
agreements between developing and developed countries. Such agreements are not RTAs 
categorized in Article XXIV; nor are they generalized preferential schemes justified by the 
Enabling Clause. A representative example is the Cotonou Agreement, a successor to the 
Lomé Convention, which was signed by the EC member states and the ACP countries.38 In 
addition, the United States offers duty-free non-reciprocal access to most Caribbean and 
sub-Saharan countries through the US-Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) 
and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), both of which were enacted under 
federal US law. In this part, the focus of the paper turns to how these trade arrangements 
remain compatible with WTO rules. 
 
IV-1.  The Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement 
 
In 1975, the EC and the ACP countries concluded a framework agreement known as the 
Lomé Convention, which has subsequently provided the structure for trade and cooperation 
between these two groups. This convention was designed on the basis of the EC’s aid policy 
for the ACP countries (former colonies of some EC member states). Since 1975, the Lomé 
Convention has been renewed four times in order to strengthen the integration of ACP states 
into the global economy. The last agreement under this name (Lomé IV) expired at the end of 
February 2000 and was replaced by an agreement which serves as the framework for new and 
more comprehensive relations between the EC and the ACP countries. This new agreement, 
known as the ACP-European Union (EU) Partnership Agreement, was signed in Cotonou, 
Benin, on June 23, 2000.39 
                                                     
38 Currently the ACP group consists of seventy-seven members. 
39 The official name of this agreement is Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its Member States, 
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The main objective behind the Lomé Convention was not to form a free trade area in 
terms of Article XXIV but to lay the legal foundation for a development assistance scheme 
from the EC to the ACP countries. Therefore, the Lomé Convention set up a preferential and 
non-reciprocal trading system favoring the ACP countries by allowing them almost free 
access to EC markets for nearly all industrial goods and for a wide range of agricultural 
products. Moreover, regarding banana imports, in accordance with the Lomé Convention, the 
EC granted preferential trade arrangements to ACP countries by imposing no duties and 
introducing a preferential quota only for ACP countries.40 However, these preferences 
became the subject of arguments as to whether they violated MFN treatment. In April 1993, 
five Latin American countries41 filed a compliant before the GATT concerning the EU’s 
banana import regime. 
In the banana dispute, there were two points of debate concerning North-South RTAs: 
first, whether the Lomé Convention fell under the category of free trade areas defined in 
Article XXIV; and second, whether Article XXIV: 8, which provides essential requirements 
for free trade areas, could be interpreted as adhering to the spirit of Part IV of the GATT.42 
Based on the dispute settlement rules and procedures, a panel was established to examine 
these matters, and it concluded that the EU’s preferences for ACP countries constituted 
Article I MFN violations and, as such, could not be justified on the grounds of Article 
XXIV.43 The panel also deemed that Article XXIV: 8 could not be read in conjunction with 
Part IV. On the first issue, the panel described its reasoning—that the Lomé Convention was 
a non-reciprocal agreement which do not meet the definition of a free trade area in the sense 
of Article XXIV—in the following manner: 
  
[T]he use of the plural in the phrases “between the constituent territories” and 
“originating in such territories” made it clear that only agreements providing for an 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of the Other Part. The Agreement entered into force in June 2000 and will be valid for a period of twenty 
years, subject to revision every five years. 
40 The EU has allowed a significantly larger amount of imports from ACP producers because of a historical 
relationship between the exporting countries and European nations. Carew considers “the fact that the 
preference exists for ACP producers is a remnant of European colonial policy. The EU is bound to this policy 
by the Lomé convention.” Richard Carew, The US-EU Banana Dispute,” an article in The short.run.com,  
(Jan.22, 2002), http://www.theshortrun.com/articles/Ricky%20Carew/banana.html (last visited May 4, 2007). 
41 The members who requested the panel were Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela. 
42 Five Latin American countries claimed that the EEC measures were not justified under Article XXIV, since 
the Lomé Convention did not meet the conditions of a free trade area as set out in that Article. The claim of 
the EEC was that its banana import measures, even if inconsistent with Article I, were justified under the 
provisions of Article XXIV and, also, that the conditions set out in Article XXIV: 8(b) had to be read in the 
light of Part IV of the General Agreement. 
43 GATT, supra note 13. 
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obligation to liberalize the trade in products originating in all of the constituent 
territories could be considered to establish a free-trade area within the meaning of 
Article XXIV:8(b). … The [Lomé] Convention … did not provide for any 
liberalization of trade in products originating in the EEC. … This lack of any 
obligation of the sixty-nine ACP countries to dismantle their trade barriers, and the 
acceptance of an obligation to remove trade barriers only on imports into the 
customs territory of the EEC, made the trade arrangements set out in the Convention 
substantially different from those of a free trade area, as defined in Article 
XXIV:8(b).44 
 
As to the relationship between Article XXIV and Part IV, Article XXXVI: 8 limits the 
right of developed contracting parties to demand reciprocity from developing contracting 
parties in procedures under the General Agreement. The panel interpreted the phrase, “in 
procedures under the General Agreement,” as not including procedures leading to the 
formation of a non-reciprocal free trade area between developed and developing countries.45  
Moreover, the panel made reference to a previous panel report which stated that the 
spirit and objectives of Part IV could not be cited as justification for actions violating 
obligations under Part II.46 The view of the panel was that: 
 
Article XXXVI:8 and its Note were not intended to apply to negotiations outside the 
procedural framework of the General Agreement, such as negotiations of a free trade 
area. … 
That [previous] panel had found that the provisions of Part IV cannot override 
obligations, in particular the obligation to accord most-favoured-nation treatment, 
owed under other parts of the General Agreement. … 
[T]he wording and underlying rationale of Article XXXVI:8 and its Note, and also 
its drafting history and subsequent interpretation in GATT practice, made clear that 
it was neither intended to modify Article XXIV:8(b) nor to justify preferences 
                                                     
44 Id, at paragraph 159. 
45 Id, at paragraph 160. 
46 The panel noted the drafting history of Part IV of the GATT as supporting its interpretation. During the 
negotiations of Part IV, the authorization of special preferences to developing countries had been suggested 
but had not been included in the final text, which, according to the panel, meant that non-reciprocal 
agreements between developed and developing countries had not been considered justifiable in the provisions 
of Part IV. Id, at paragraph 162. 
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inconsistent with Article I:1 other than those specially provided for in Article 
XXIV.47 
 
After the release of the panel report on the banana dispute, the EU and ACP countries 
requested that a waiver be granted for the Lomé Convention based on the procedures of 
Article XXV of the General Agreement, and this waiver was granted by the WTO until the 
Lomé Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000.48 
Even though EU member states undertook a fundamental review of their relationship 
with ACP countries when they replaced the Lomé Convention, they still considered the 
Cotonou Agreement as a part of their policy to aid and assist in the development of those 
countries.49 Consequently, the Cotonou Agreement inherited the non-reciprocal preferential 
trade arrangement from the Lomé Convention, which was incompatible with WTO rules. In 
order to avoid a recurrence of the same disputes that had plagued the Lomé Convention, 
participants to the Cotonou Agreement obtained a seven-year waiver from WTO rules at the 
Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001. However, most parties to the Cotonou 
Agreement anticipated much difficulty in renewing the waiver owing to the deep-rooted 
criticism against preferential trade arrangements from GATT contracting parties who had 
been excluded.50 Before 2008, therefore, the Cotonou Agreement would have to be made 
into a new agreement compatible with WTO rules. The EU proposed to replace preferential 
trade provisions in the Cotonou Agreement with reciprocal free trade agreements (FTAs) in 
order to meet the requirements of Article XXIV. Because of the difficulties involved in 
concluding one broad FTA among all the countries concerned, the new scheme divides the 
ACP countries into seven groups by region, with FTAs concluded between the EU and each 
of these groups. The first phase of negotiations between the EU and ACP countries as a whole, 
in which all participants reached an agreement in principle on shifting the Cotonou 
Agreement toward separate FTAs, was carried out from September 2002. The second phase 
                                                     
47 Id, paragraph 161 and 162. 
48 The GATT members decided that “the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article I of the General Agreement shall 
be waived, until 29 February 2000, to the extent necessary to permit the European Communities to provide 
preferential treatment for products originating in ACP States as required by the relevant provisions of the 
Fourth Lomé Convention, without being required to extend the same preferential treatment to like products of 
any other contracting party.” Id. 
49 The EU explained the reason for reconsidering the Cotonou Agreement as a result of a fundamental 
turnaround of EU trade and aid policy and not as a result of the agreement’s incompatibility with WTO rules. 
The EC started a comprehensive approach to assist in the economic development of developing countries not 
only in trade but also in other fields, such as finance and human resource development, which made it 
necessary to revise the Cotonou Agreement. 
50 Under article XXV of the General Agreement, a waiver requires approval by a two-thirds majority of the 
votes cast and one-half of the contracting parties. 
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of negotiations, between the EU and each of the seven groups, began in October 2003 and is 
currently ongoing.  
 
IV-2.  CBERA 
 
The CBERA, commonly referred to as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), was enacted as a 
domestic law of the United States in August 1983 and was implemented from 1984.51 It 
authorizes the United States to provide unilaterally to eligible Caribbean countries 
preferential trade and tax benefits including duty-free access to the US market for eligible 
products. Its main objective is to help the Caribbean Basin countries diversify their 
economies and expand their exports (USTR 1999: 8). Twenty-four countries and territories 
are currently designated as beneficiaries corresponding to the purpose of the CBI.52  
At the inauguration of the CBI scheme, the United States sought a GATT waiver for its 
obligations under Article I because the application of the CBI would potentially constitute an 
MFN violation. In addition, the Enabling Clause did not justify geographically-limited 
preferences such as the CBI. There was much deliberation in the examination of the proposed 
CBI waiver under the GATT, but with the strong support of the beneficiary countries and 
territories, the United States successfully received a waiver of Article I in 1984.53? The 
waiver has been renewed several times and is currently valid until December 31, 2005.54  
One of the key questions surrounding the CBI has concerned the eligibility criteria for 
designation as a beneficiary country. On the basis of the CBI criteria, not only Asian or 
African countries but also several Central American and Caribbean countries were excluded 
from CBI benefits. Some GATT members have claimed that such exclusions were 
incompatible with MFN treatment and even Part IV of the General Agreement, which aims to 
promote the economic development of all developing countries. Although they regard the 
CBI objective of promoting economic and political stability among the Caribbean Basin 
                                                     
51 The Act was originally scheduled to remain in effect until September 30, 1995, but was amended in 1990 by 
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act, known as CBERA II or CBI II, in order to make the 
CBERA a permanent program. Moreover, in May 2000, the U.S.-Caribbean Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) 
was enacted, thereby expanding the list of duty-free products and offering greater access to the US market for 
eligible countries. 
52 Presently, the eligible countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and the British Virgin Islands. 
53 For details of discussions with respect to the first CBI waiver, see South-North Development Monitor, U.S. 
Waiver Requested for Caribbean to Be Voted in GATT (November 13, 1984),  
http://www.sunsonline.org/trade/process/during/8485/country/11130184.htm (last visited May 4, 2007). 
54 WTO, Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act: Renewal of Waiver, WT/L/104, November 24 (1995). 
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countries as desirable, other GATT member countries, especially those excluded, have argued 
that this objective should not be viewed as sufficient justification for a waiver.55  
Some members have further stated that they prefer the strengthening of a GSP as the 
best way of promoting trade by developing countries. However, during the examination of 
the proposed CBI waiver, the United States argued that the CBI was one element of its GSP 
scheme. The US view was that its special preferences under the CBI could be covered by the 
Enabling Clause. In response to this stance, the GATT secretariat suggested that “the 
Enabling Clause covered only specific arrangements laid down in it and not those envisaged 
under CBERA” (South-North Development Monitor 1984). At present, the United States 
distinguishes the CBI from a GSP in the following terms: “The CBI program is … 
independent of the U.S. GSP program as a matter of statute and a matter of policy.”56 
 
IV-3.  AGOA 
 
The AGOA is a constitutive part of the US domestic legislation, entitled the Trade and 
Development Act of 2000, which also contains the CBI scheme.57 The Act identifies certain 
sub-Saharan African countries as being eligible for AGOA benefits and offers them 
preferential access to the US market. Specifically, the AGOA expands the list of duty-free 
products under the GSP program of the United States only for AGOA eligible countries, as 
well as quota-free exports of textile and apparel products to the United States.58 
Along with the CBI, the objective of the AGOA itself is generally considered positive. 
However, several issues of concern have arisen.59 In terms of WTO compatibility, the 
AGOA faces problems because beneficiaries have been chosen in a limited manner. The 
criteria for eligibility under the AGOA are divided into two stages. Firstly, the AGOA 
extends the possibility of favored trade status in accordance with geographical criteria, or 
forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries. Secondly, the AGOA recognizes a country as 
eligible when the governments of these countries follow the pre-determined social and 
economic criteria. To be eligible, a country must have established or be making continual 
                                                     
55 South-North Development Monitor, supra note 53. 
56 WTO, Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act: Request for Renewal of Waiver, G/L/25, September 15 (1995). 
57 The Act entered into effect in October 2000 and will continue until September 2008. 
58 Washington Trade Report, Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, 1999. 
59 Skeptical views of the AGOA have appeared in various fields. Apart from doubts over its compatibility with 
the WTO, the issue of rules of origin is the most controversial problem. For details on this matter, see Flank 
Flatters, Rules of Origin and AGOA: Hard Choices for Textiles and Clothing and ASDC, a research report 
prepared for SADC Secretariat, June 30, (2002). 
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progress toward establishing: a market-based economy, the rule of law, the elimination of 
barriers to US trade and investment, economic policies to reduce poverty, the protection of 
internationally-recognized worker rights, and a system to combat corruption. Additionally, a 
country is examined to see whether it adopts policies that: do not interfere with US national 
security or foreign policy, do not violate internationally-recognized human rights, do not 
support international terrorism, and eliminate the worst forms of child labor.60 In the WTO 
trade policy review of the United States, the EC points out that “the eligibility to AGOA is 
not only dependent on objective criteria related to the development status of individual 
countries.” Where political and non-objective criteria are used to determine AGOA benefits, 
the EC is skeptical of whether these criteria are “square with the applicable WTO rules 
governing such arrangements.”61  
Like the CBI, the AGOA offers a more expansive range of duty-free treatment than a 
GSP,62 which means that the AGOA program is sometimes regarded as an extended version 
of a GSP scheme. The AGOA program, however, does not apply to all developed or least 
developed countries. Moreover, if the AGOA were to be modified, the US, as a WTO 
member, would have to notify the relevant changes to the CTD, which is in charge of GSP 
schemes. However, there is no report from the Untied States regarding such a modification. 
Thus, the AGOA can be recognized as a non-reciprocal and geographically-based preferential 
trade arrangement which needs a WTO waiver. As with established practices in the CBI and 
other preferential schemes for limited groups of developing countries conducted by the 
United States, it is most likely that the United States will request a waiver for the AGOA.63 
When the AGOA scheme was introduced, the US government also showed its intention to 
obtain a waiver for the AGOA’s preferential access provisions. 
Interestingly, the AGOA also contemplates the future negotiation of an FTA between the 
United States and AGOA beneficiaries, but as yet no action toward negotiations on such an 
agreement has started.64 It remains to be seen whether the United States has a strategy or 
intention to change preferential trade arrangements into FTAs in order to achieve consistency 
with WTO rules. However, this would be one of several possible ways for non-reciprocal 
                                                     
60 USTR, Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, The Third of Eight Annual Reports, May, 2003, 
at 9). Under the AGOA, for their eligibility status to be determined, forty-eight potential beneficiaries have 
their cases reviewed annually.. 
61 EC, Questions and Comments on behalf of the EC, a paper submitted to the WTO trade policy review for 
USA, January 14 and 16, 2004 
62 Washington Trade Report, supra note 58. 
63 Interview with a WTO official, November 2003. 
64 Washington Trade Report, supra note 58. 
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North-South RTAs to be authorized in the WTO legal framework. 
 
 
V.  North-South RTAs and Issues of WTO Compatibility 
 
In view of the current legal system of the WTO, it is impossible not to conclude that specific 
trade preferences for limited groups of developing countries are incompatible with WTO 
rules. Countries concerned with North-South RTAs, therefore, have strived to create various 
measures in order to achieve compliance with the WTO. 
 
V-1.  Possible Options for WTO compatibility 
 
The essential characteristics of North-South preferential schemes, which provide benefits to 
limited groups of developing countries, are their non-generalized and non-reciprocal features. 
The former feature excludes such North-South RTAs from the coverage of the Enabling 
Clause. On the other hand, due to the second feature, North-South RTAs cannot fulfill the 
criteria of FTAs as stipulated in Article XXIV. Therefore, North-South RTAs inevitably 
come into conflict with Article I. There are three possible ways for states to justify their 
preferential schemes as deviations from MFN treatment: (a) by obtaining a WTO waiver 
pursuant to Article IX of the WTO Agreement; (b) by extending specific preferences to all 
developing countries; and (c) by creating free trade areas, as specified in Article XXIV of the 
General Agreement. 
In the past, countries have maintained these specific preferences usually by obtaining 
waivers. However, gaining a waiver under the WTO has lately become a more difficult 
process. This is partly because in 1995 the reform of the GATT into a new institution, the 
WTO, brought about the enhancement and expansion of the “rule of law.” As a result, there 
was an increasing belief that exceptions which could erode the legal system had to be 
restrained minimally. Even if the WTO grants waivers for North-South RTAs, the waiver 
period is now shorter than most cases in the past. Those preferential schemes that have not 
yet received waivers are likely to be examined by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for 
their consistency with WTO rules when a case is brought before the DSB.65 
                                                     
65 For instance, India called for the establishment of a panel under the DSU that would examine the EU’s 
special tariff preferences to the so-called Drug Arrangements, under which only twelve developing countries 
could benefit. The WTO issued a panel report on December 1, 2003, and found the EU’s arrangement to be in 
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The second option for attaining WTO compatibility for preferential trade schemes has 
become of little effect. GSP preferences are to be non-discriminatory across developing 
countries except for those favoring the least developed countries (LDCs). In order to 
assimilate geographically-limited preferences into GSP schemes, some preference-giving 
countries have attempted to generalize these schemes. The Everything But Arms (EBA) 
initiative of the EU, which grants duty- and quota-free access for all goods exported by LDCs, 
and the AGOA scheme of the United States are often cited as prominent examples.66 
However, such schemes should be distinguished from the generalization of North-South 
RTAs. The EBA precludes advanced developing-countries that are eligible for the Cotonou 
Agreement, and the AGOA limits its geographical range to sub-Saharan African countries. 
Moreover, both sides to North-South RTAs share negative views about the extension of 
limited preferences to all developing countries. Developing countries might lose existing 
preferences. On the other hand, developed countries might lose their strategic measures for 
assisting specific groups of developing countries. 
In these circumstances, countries in recent years have actively attempted to substitute 
specific preferences with free trade areas, which are officially permitted in the WTO system. 
The EU’s policy to replace the Cotonou Agreement by seven FTAs is a good example. The 
United States also considers the AGOA as a first step toward FTAs with sub-Saharan African 
countries.67 However, the criteria for concluding FTAs are not defined precisely, and the 
examination mechanism for determining their consistency with WTO rules does not function 
properly. In addition, some degree of “flexibility” is permitted in FTA practices, which 
makes it likely that WTO members will utilize FTAs as a tool for obscuring the 
incompatibility of North-South RTAs with WTO rules. 
 
V-2.  Flexibility in North-South RTAs 
 
North-South RTAs would be approved as FTAs only if all participants reciprocally liberalized 
their trade practices. However, it is difficult to apply symmetrical obligations, such as tariff 
                                                                                                                                                                     
violation of trade rules because it discriminated against other developing countries. 
66 FAO, The Future of Preferential Trade Arrangements for Developing Countries and the Current Round of 
WTO Negotiation on Agriculture (Apr. 2003) (on file with author), and B. Hoekman et al., More favorable 
and differential treatment of developing countries: Towards a new approach in the WTO, 6 (World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper, No. 3107, 2003). 
67 IPC (International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council) (2003), Revisiting Special Preferences for 
Developing Countries, IPC Issue Brief Number One (May 1, 2003), 
http://www.agritrade.org/publ/Publications/Preferences/Special%20PreferencesFinal.pdf (last visited March 23, 
2004). 
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elimination, among participants which are unequal in the terms of economic strength. Thus, 
developing countries, in particular ACP countries, often request limitations to the degree of 
reciprocity in FTAs or seek techniques to avoid granting full reciprocity. As Onguglo and Ito 
point out, “there exists a legal lacuna in terms of availability of SDT” in respect to 
North-South RTAs.68 Past experiences in the WTO suggest that a certain degree of flexibility 
is allowed in the formation of North-South RTAs. For example, a transitional period of 
twelve years is provided in the framework of the FTA between the EU and South Africa.69 In 
the cases of the EU-Tunisia FTA and the Canada-Chile FTA, developing countries are 
permitted to take more than ten years for liberalization and set aside sensitive products from 
their liberalization list, whereas developed countries have to liberalize immediately on 
substantially all the trade. 
The concept of flexibility is legally based on the term “exceptional cases” in the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV. Paragraph 3 of the Understanding 
states that “[t]he ‘reasonable length of time’ referred to in paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV 
should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases” (author’s italics). In Article V paragraph 3 
of the GATS, moreover, the term “flexibility” for developing countries is explicitly 
mentioned: 
 
Where developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type referred to in 
paragraph 1, flexibility shall be provided for regarding the conditions set out in 
paragraph 1, particularly with reference to subparagpaph (b) [this means the 
condition “a reasonable length of time”] thereof, in accordance with the level of 
development of the countries concerned both overall and in individual sectors and 
subsectors.  
 
The GATS, however, does not characterize the available flexibility. Consequently, while the 
SDT for developing countries is recognized in RTAs on services, its practical usage remains 
unspecific.70 
Like the situation in the GATS, it is matter of argument as to the condition in Article 
                                                     
68 Bonapas Onguglo and Taisuke Ito, How to make EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreements) WTO 
compatible?: Reforming the rules on regional trade agreements, Discussion Paper, no. 40, July, European 
Center for Development Policy Management, 2003, at 1. 
69 Sanoussi Bilal, Implications of the Doha Development Agenda on the EPA negotiation, a paper submitted to 
the Seminar on the EPA, October 31–November 1, 2002, at Lusaka, Zambia, at 5. 
70 Id, at 6. 
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XXIV to which flexibility applies.71 Judging by the precedents, flexibility applies mostly in 
two spheres: in the transition period and in the product coverage. The former allows 
deviations under the “reasonable length of time” condition, while the latter allows deviations 
under the “substantially all the trade” condition. The view of the CRTA, however, is that the 
concept of flexibility applies only in the transition period and that the issue of product 
coverage is outside the scope of flexibility. In accordance with this view, not a few cases of 
RTAs have persuaded longer time frame as a transitional period than ten years without a 
waiver. On the contrary, even though the flexibility in product coverage constitutes de facto 
acceptance of SDT, no legal guarantee is given in respect to the compliance of these 
provisions with WTO rules. There is much skepticism on flexibility in product coverage as 
neglect of an Article XXIV requirement. 
Besides the ambiguity of the flexibility concept and lack of any mechanism to ensure 
effective implementation of SDT, what makes the legal framework on RTAs even more 
obscure is that both available rules for North-South RTAs—those on RTAs and those on 
SDT—are under review in the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations of the so-called Doha 
Development Agenda.72 The form and content of RTAs currently under negotiation or 
consultation will be influenced by the outcome of this New Round. In reviewing RTA rules, 
“the negotiations shall take into account development aspects of regional trade agreement.”73 
This provision reflects a concern by certain developing countries that are eager to introduce 
more flexibility into rules relating to North-South RTAs.74 Interestingly, the request to apply 
some SDT provisions to North-South RTAs was proposed at the Seattle Ministerial Meeting 
in 1999. This proposal, however, was not adopted as part of the agenda at that conference. 
But developing countries have strongly demanded the enhancement of SDT regularly.75 
Their requirement is based on the idea that SDT provisions “are to be looked at not as 
exceptions to the general rules but more importantly as an integral and inherent objective of 
                                                     
71 Onguglo and Ito divide the concept of flexibility into two categories: “existing flexibility” and “additional 
flexibility.” They argue that SDT for developing countries falls under the latter type of flexibility. They also 
examine the modalities for granting additional flexibility in respect to each condition of Article XXIV. 
Onguglo and Ito, supra note 68, at 49–63. 
72 The ministers at the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001 mandated the CTD to examine STD provisions 
with the phrase that “all special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational.” WTO, Ministerial Declaration 
of November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, November 14 (2001), paragraph 44. According to this declaration, 
the CTD has to consider measures or mechanisms to enhance SDT provisions. So far, the CTD has divided 
various proposals relating to SDT into three categories so that it can establish the priorities for strengthening 
the STD provisions. 
73 WTO, supra note 72, paragraph 29. 
74 Bilal, supra note 69, at 6. 
75 WTO, Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential Treatment, WT/GC/W/442, 
September 19 (2001). 
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the multilateral trading system.”76 It is difficult to infer even the outline of a set of relevant 
rules from the current status of negotiations. 
 
V-3.  The Concern about Differentiation 
 
The introduction of an SDT clause in Article XXIV would have a negative impact in one 
sense. It would lead to a segmentalization of preferential schemes which would result in 
dividing legal disciplines into pluralistic pieces. It could trigger exclusive trading blocs also 
involving developing countries. One of the most problematic issues is that it would provide 
an explicit legal base to the de facto differentiation among developing countries. Panagariya 
is concerned that “the preferences also became an instrument of breaking the united front 
presented by a group of developing countries.”77 
The traditional approach toward development issues in the GATT/WTO still emphasizes 
that developing countries need appropriate strategies as a package rather than strategies that 
focus on sectoral and divisive programs such as the Cotonou Agreement, the CBI and the 
AGOA. From a poverty-reduction point of view, there is alarm that “preferences should focus 
on the poor, wherever they are geographically located, and not on a limited set of countries. 
… Limiting preferences to LDCs or concentrating on a specific geographic region such as 
sub-Saharan Africa ignores the majority of the poor in the world today.” 78  Even if 
differentiation between developing countries is necessary, the preferences for development 
are to be accorded not because of political, cultural or even geographical ties, but because of 
the difference in the levels of economic development.79 
By contrast, others point out the positive effect of differentiation between developing 
countries. Many of the preference-receiving developing countries have benefited substantially 
from gaining preferential access for their exports. These trade preferences were originally 
conceived as a means to increase production and exports of developing countries so that they 
would eventually become more competitive internationally.80 As the distinct qualities of 
                                                     
76 In order to realize their goals, developing countries proposed the establishment of a concrete and binding 
SDT regime that would be responsive to their development needs. They also requested WTO members to 
elaborate a framework/umbrella agreement on SDT. Id. 
77 Panagariya fears that inter alia such differentiation by preferences would be utilized by developed countries 
to break the generally unified position of a large majority of developing countries against Singapore on issues 
like the inclusion of labor standards into WTO agreements. Arvind Panagariya, Is this “free” meal worth 
having?, ECON. TIMES, Jun. 19, 2002. 
78 Hoekman et al, supra note 66, at 6. 
79 Yusuf, supra note 33, at 492. 
80 Preferences are effective, especially in the field of agriculture. An FAO report pointed out that trade 
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WTO members, such as economic strength and human resource skills, become diversified, 
the capacity to implement WTO disciplines will vary from country to country. Advocates 
regard these circumstances as a rationale for differentiation between developing countries in 
determining the reach of resource-intensive WTO rules.81 The issue of differentiation is not 
peculiar to South-North RTAs. It is difficult to find the necessary unity to resolve intertwined 
and implicated agendas among countries with conflicting interests as found in the WTO. 
 
 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Recently, there has been a surge in bilateral and regional trade arrangements between 
developed and developing countries. These arrangements are known as North-South RTAs. 
In connection with these RTAs, a question arises as to what kinds of rules are applicable to 
such arrangements. Under the current WTO legal system, RTAs involving trade in goods are 
largely governed by Article XXIV of the General Agreement, while RTAs in services are 
governed by Article V of the GATS. RTAs are by definition discriminatory. This means they 
inevitably violate the MFN obligation, which is the fundamental principle of the WTO. 
However, many WTO members regard RTAs as necessary to develop or reconstruct their 
economies. In order to justify such MFN violations, therefore, each set of rules on RTAs has 
been incorporated into the General Agreement and the GATS.  
Besides these provisions, another provision applying to RTAs among developing 
countries is the Enabling Clause. The Enabling Clause stemmed from the ambitious quest of 
developing countries during the 1960s to gain SDT within the multilateral trading system. 
These countries firstly materialized the GSP schemes among their overall demands, under 
which the developed countries could grant preferential market access across all developing 
countries by unilaterally reducing tariffs despite the conflict between these schemes and the 
MFN clause. With the intention to introduce GSP schemes into the GATT legal framework, 
the GATT member-states approved GSPs as an exception to MFN treatment through a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
preferences have benefited many countries in developing their agricultural exports as a major source of 
foreign exchange. FAO, supra note 66. 
81 Hoekman et al further proclaims that “some WTO disciplines may not be appropriate for very small countries 
in that the regulatory institutions that are required may be unduly costly.” They lay out the basic rationale for 
differentiation, which is that “certain agreements may simply not be development priorities or they may 
require many other preconditions to be satisfied before implementation will be beneficial.” These predictions 
can be required in proportion to per capita income, institutional capacity and economic scale, instead of being 
applied across the board. Hoekman et al, supra note 66, at 16. 
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ten-year waiver in 1971 and, in effect, provided a permanent waiver in 1979 through the 
Enabling Clause. This clause also covers SDT in those RTAs that consist of only developing 
countries. 
Article XXIV of the General Agreement and Article V of the GATS set out several 
criteria for forming RTAs. These are: a “substantially all the trade” condition, a “reasonable 
length of time” condition, and the condition that there should be reciprocal liberalization 
among constituents. On the other hand, the Enabling Clause provides legal status only for 
generalized and non-reciprocal schemes, not for schemes that select only some developing 
countries. According to current WTO rules, North-South RTAs, unlike GSP schemes, must 
be reciprocal and must cover substantially all the trade. Special preferential schemes of the 
past were mainly implemented by the EC and the United States. The EU’s arrangement, 
which only applies to ACP countries, began with the Lomé Convention (now the Cotonou 
Agreement), while the United States established the CBI and the AGOA (legislated as 
national law), which benefits Caribbean or sub-Saharan countries through a discriminatory 
tariff measure. None of these specific trade preferences, which are aimed at limited groups of 
developing countries, meet the criteria stipulated in Article XXIV, and hence all preferences 
need a waiver from WTO rules. 
The usual practice has been for the countries concerned to maintain their special trade 
preferences by obtaining a waiver. However, in recent years, obtaining waivers from the 
WTO has become more difficult, and, as a consequence, the countries involved have replaced 
trade preferences by concluding FTAs. However, such FTAs are also problematic. Firstly, the 
concept of flexibility mentioned above is less than obvious. Member countries could exploit 
this concept and end up neglecting the WTO legal framework. Moreover, available 
disciplines on North-South trade arrangements—rules on RTAs and SDT—are on the 
negotiating table at the New Round, and so the outcome of this Round will impact upon the 
content of North-South RTAs. However, there is no way of knowing the kind of agreement 
that might be reached at the New Round; therefore, it is unclear what rules will apply to 
North-South RTAs in the future. 
Another problem is that the approval of SDT for the provision of special preferences to some 
developing countries could provide a legal foundation for differentiation between developing 
countries. If SDT provisions are incorporated into the North-South RTA rules, preferences for 
development could be provided not on the basis of MFN treatment, but on the basis of geographical or 
other arbitrary criteria. However, the provision of preferences to a limited number of countries makes 
deviation from SDT an issue fundamental to the debate of how preferences should be provided to 
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developing countries. So far, SDT has been seen as a way to improve the competitive position of 
developing countries. Instead, the position of developing countries might be weakened if some 
developing countries get special preferences. As such, there needs to be a deep and comprehensive 
discussion on how to fulfill the lack of SDT in North-South RTAs. 
